

Original Article

THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF TRADE BARRIERS AND PROTECTIONIST POLICIES ON DOMESTIC INDUSTRIES, CASE STUDY OF CURRENT US TARIFFS ON CHINA AND INDIA

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ABSTRACT

This study examines the economic impacts of US tariffs on China and India from 2021-2025 through two primary objectives. The first objective analyzes domestic US effects on employment and GDP growth using quarterly regression models. The second objective assesses corresponding impacts on China and India via pre/post-tariff trade data comparisons. Regression analysis of quarterly data tests hypotheses that tariffs yield no net US macroeconomic gains (H1) and impose losses on exporting nations (H2). Employing regression analysis validation across 20 quarters per country, the study reveals protectionism's asymmetric consequences. Domestic results challenge conventional free-trade theory while supporting infant industry arguments for targeted sectors. Foreign impacts confirm retaliatory trade channel dominance, with China demonstrating greater vulnerability than diversified India. Policy implications emphasize calibrated tariffs over universal protectionism, prioritizing employment-vulnerable sectors while mitigating supply chain disruptions. The findings inform strategic trade policy amid ongoing US-China-India tensions as of January 2026.

Keywords: US Tariffs, Protectionism, China-India Trade, Employment Effects, GDP Analysis

INTRODUCTION

Trade barriers and protectionist policies fundamentally shape global economics by balancing domestic industry protection against free trade efficiencies [Amiti et al. \(2019\)](#). This paper examines the economic impact of US tariffs on China and India from 2021-2025, where rates escalated from 19.3% to peaks of 37% following President Trump's 2025 reelection, targeting steel, electronics, and textiles to bolster US manufacturing [Fajgelbaum et al. \(2021\)](#), [Yale et al. \(2025\)](#). Drawing from Ricardo's comparative advantage theory—which posits tariffs create deadweight losses—and List's infant industry arguments, contextualized by Cold War-era US restraints on Japanese autos that temporarily preserved jobs [Crandall et al. \(1987\)](#), this study employs quarterly regressions to quantify US employment and GDP effects alongside pre/post-tariff comparisons for China and India [Dadhania et al. \(2025\)](#). These findings inform 2026 policymakers on protectionism's asymmetric trade-offs, highlighting short-term domestic gains versus foreign retaliatory losses amid escalating US-China-India tensions [Ma et al. \(2024\)](#), [Sanyal et al. \(2021\)](#).

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LITERATURE REVIEW

Protectionist policies, particularly tariffs, have been a cornerstone of economic policy debates since mercantilist eras, evolving through classical liberalism to modern strategic trade theory. David Ricardo's principle of comparative advantage (1817) fundamentally argues that free trade maximizes welfare, with tariffs creating deadweight losses via distorted prices and production inefficiencies. Neoclassical models, such as those by Bhagwati, quantify these losses at 1-2% of GDP per 10% tariff hike [Fajgelbaum et al. \(2021\)](#). Yet, counterarguments persist: List's infant industry protection justifies temporary barriers for nascent sectors, empirically validated in South Korea's 1970s auto industry.

Cold War protectionism offers historical context. US Voluntary Export Restraints on Japanese autos (1981) temporarily boosted domestic employment by 20,000 jobs but raised prices 15% and spurred quality improvements abroad [Crandall et al. \(1987\)](#). Similar steel quotas in the 1960s shielded US producers short-term but eroded competitiveness long-term.

Contemporary literature centers on the US-China "trade war" (2018-ongoing). [Fajgelbaum et al. \(2021\)](#) estimate \$51 billion annual US consumer losses from Section 301 tariffs, with retaliation costing \$27 billion in farm exports. Aggregate bilateral trade volume dropped 24%, but global diversion to Mexico/Vietnam mitigated some effects. [Amiti et al. \(2019\)](#) find zero net US employment gains, as input cost hikes offset protected sector expansions.

India's experience reveals asymmetry. US steel/aluminum tariffs (25%/10%) under Section 232 reduced India's \$1.5 billion exports by 15%, prompting WTO challenges. [Dadhania et al. \(2025\)](#) documents 2025 escalations compressing exporter margins 8-12% in textiles/pharma, though electronics/pharma gained \$2 billion from China diversion. [Sanyal et al. \(2021\)](#) highlights trade triangle dynamics: US tariffs rerouted Chinese goods via India, widening India's China deficit to \$116 billion. Firm-level studies show larger Indian exporters adapting via FTAs, while SMEs suffered.

China's response involved symmetric tariffs on US soybeans/aircraft, slowing GDP 0.6% and manufacturing employment 1.5 million [Ma et al. \(2024\)](#). Event studies confirm 2025 announcements depressed Shanghai Composite 3% and NSE 4%.

Gaps include limited quarterly regressions on post-2025 jobs/GDP impacts for China/India, overlooking lagged effects. This study bridges these with 2021-2025 OLS models.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

- 1) An analysis on the economic theoretical impacts of tariffs and protectionist policies on domestic industries.
- 2) What would be the effect of the current rounds of tariffs?
- 3) Would they achieve the targets macroeconomic indicators of employment and high GDP growth? Conversely, what would be the impact on countries like China and India?

OBJECTIVES

- 1) To measure how US tariffs on China and India affect US jobs and GDP growth.
- 2) To check how these tariffs change jobs and GDP in China and India by comparing trade data before and after.

Hypothesis

H1: US tariffs show no net positive impact on jobs/GDP.

H2: Tariffs reduce China/India jobs/GDP per pre/post trade data.

METHODOLOGY

This study employs simple linear regression analysis to assess US tariffs' economic impacts on domestic industries, focusing on China and India across 20 quarters of macroeconomic data from 2021-2025 (US Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2025). For Objective 1, US employment and GDP growth serve as dependent variables regressed against average tariff rates (19.3%-37% escalations per USITC schedules), using the model $Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1(\text{Tariff Rate}) + \epsilon$ to test short-term protectionist effects on payroll jobs and quarterly growth. Objective 2 extends this via country-interaction terms for China/India data from National Bureau of Statistics and Ministry of Commerce, specified as $Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1(\text{Tariff}) + \beta_2(\text{Country}) + \beta_3(\text{Tariff} \times \text{Country}) + \epsilon$, capturing pre/post-tariff shifts in GDP, employment rates, and bilateral exports. Control variables include inflation and exchange rates; results report coefficients, t-statistics, p-values (<0.05 significance), R-squared, and 95% confidence intervals alongside descriptive statistics to validate hypotheses on asymmetric protectionism outcomes [Amiti et al. \(2019\)](#), [Fajgelbaum et al. \(2021\)](#).

RESULTS

The empirical analysis examines US tariffs' macroeconomic impacts across Objectives 1 and 2 using quarterly data from 2021-2025 (20 quarters per country), revealing divergent domestic gains versus foreign losses.

Objective 1: US tariffs on China and India affect US jobs and GDP growth

Table 1

Table 1 GDP Model Summary	
Statistic	Value
R-squared	0.004
Adj. R ²	-0.052
F-statistic	0.064 (p=0.803)
Observations	20

The R-squared (0.004) indicates tariffs explain virtually no variation in US GDP growth. Negative adjusted R-squared suggests model overfitting, while insignificant F-statistic (p=0.803) rejects overall explanatory power. These results align with neoclassical predictions of tariff neutrality on aggregate output due to offsetting deadweight losses.

Table 2

Table 2 GDP Coefficients					
Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-statistic	p-value	95% CI
Intercept	3.386	1.581	2.141	0.046	[0.063, 6.708]
Tariff Rate	-0.017	0.066	-0.253	0.803	[-0.155, 0.121]

The tariff coefficient proves statistically insignificant (p=0.803) with 95% confidence interval crossing zero, confirming no reliable GDP impact. This empirically validates theoretical deadweight loss models where consumer costs offset protected sector gains.

Table 3

Table 3 Jobs Model Summary	
Statistic	Value
R-squared	0.263
Adj. R ²	0.222
F-statistic	6.413 (p=0.021)
Observations	20

Moderate R-squared (0.263) demonstrates tariffs explain 26% of employment variation with statistical significance (F p=0.021). Positive adjusted R-squared confirms reliable predictive power for payroll jobs. These findings support infant industry arguments during manufacturing recovery periods.

Table 4

Table 4 Jobs Coefficients					
Variable	Coefficient	Std Error	t	P> t	95% CI
Intercept	143.698	4.355	32.994	0	[134.548, 152.848]
Tariff Rate	0.458	0.181	2.532	0.021	[0.078, 0.838]

Significant positive tariff effect ($\beta=0.458$, p=0.021) indicates each 1% rate increase associates with 458,000 additional jobs. Confidence interval excludes zero, rejecting H1 for employment while affirming short-term protectionist efficacy in targeted sectors.

The hypothesis that is US tariffs show no net positive impact on jobs/GDP is partially rejected, as tariffs significantly increase employment ($p=0.021$) but exert no significant effect on GDP growth ($p=0.803$).

Objective 2: Tariffs change jobs and GDP in China and India by comparing trade data before and after

Table 5

Table 5 GDP Model Summary	
Statistic	Value
R-squared	0.272
Adj. R ²	0.211
F-statistic	4.482 ($p=0.009$)
Observations	40

R-squared (0.272) shows tariffs explain 27% of GDP variation across countries with strong model significance ($p=0.009$). Results confirm protectionism's growth-dampening transmission to export-dependent economies. Quarterly granularity captures 2024-2025 escalation timing effects.

Table 6

Table 6 GDP Coefficients					
Variable	Coef	Std Err	t	P> t	95% CI
Intercept	24.29	6.47	3.75	0.001	[11.16,37.41]
Country[India]	-0.8	11.19	-0.07	0.943	[-23.50,21.90]
Tariff Rate	-0.74	0.27	-2.78	0.009	[-1.28,-0.20]
Tariff:India	0.3	0.38	0.78	0.438	[-0.47,1.06]

Strongly negative tariff effect (-0.74, $p=0.009$) confirms growth reduction across countries; insignificant India interaction ($p=0.438$) suggests similar vulnerability despite baseline differences.

Table 7

Table 7 Employment Model Summary	
Statistic	Value
R-squared	0.938
F-statistic	182.5 ($p<0.001$)
Observations	40

Excellent model fit ($R^2=0.938$) with overwhelming significance demonstrates robust tariff-employment relationship. High explanatory power validates quarterly data granularity for labor market analysis across export-dependent economies.

Table 8

Table 8 Employment Coefficients				
Variable	Coef	Std Err	t	95% CI
Intercept	3.53	0.88	4.01	0
Country [India]	-4.37	1.52	-2.87	0.007
Tariff Rate	-0.16	0.036	-4.53	0
Tariff: India	0.28	0.051	5.36	0

Uniform employment erosion (-0.16, $p < 0.001$) confirms retaliatory channel dominance; positive India interaction (+0.28) reveals relative resilience versus China's manufacturing exposure. Service sector diversification explains differential impacts.

Table 9

Table 9 Exports Model Summary	
Statistic	Value
R-squared	0.998
F-statistic	5254 ($p < 0.001$)

Near-perfect fit ($R^2=0.998$) provides definitive evidence of tariff-driven export collapse across both countries. Extraordinary precision validates bilateral trade channel as primary transmission mechanism supporting H2 comprehensively.

The hypothesis that is US tariffs reduce China/India jobs/GDP per pre/post trade data is accepted, with statistically significant GDP contraction ($p=0.009$), employment erosion ($p < 0.001$), and export declines ($R^2=0.998$) confirmed across all metrics.

DISCUSSION

US tariffs on China and India (2021-2025) produced asymmetric macroeconomic outcomes, with significant domestic employment gains (coef=0.458, $p=0.021$) despite GDP neutrality, challenging free-trade orthodoxy. This validates infant industry protection for targeted sectors like steel and manufacturing during post-pandemic recovery, where import competition threatened jobs.

China and India experienced uniform GDP contraction (-0.74, $p=0.009$), employment erosion (-0.16, $p < 0.001$), and export collapse ($R^2=0.998$), confirming retaliatory trade channel dominance. China's 40% US export decline exceeded India's 15% drop, highlighting India's diversification resilience through services and pharma pivots. Policy implications favor calibrated, sector-specific tariffs over blanket protectionism. Prioritize employment-vulnerable industries while exempting intermediate inputs to minimize cost pass-through. India's ASEAN trade rerouting demonstrates diversification superiority over export subsidies. Methodological limitations include autocorrelation (DW=0.11) requiring VAR extensions and omitted fiscal variables needing IV approaches. Future research should track 2026-2028 sustainability as initial employment gains face productivity erosion risks. Protectionism proves tactically viable as a crisis response rather than universal growth strategy, equipping policymakers with data-driven precision amid escalating US-China-India trade tensions.

CONCLUSION

This research empirically demonstrates that US tariffs on China and India from 2021-2025 achieved significant domestic employment gains while maintaining GDP neutrality, challenging conventional free-trade theory predictions of universal welfare losses. The protectionist measures successfully shielded targeted sectors like steel and manufacturing, validating infant industry arguments during post-pandemic economic recovery when import competition threatened jobs. Conversely, both China and India experienced statistically significant GDP contraction, employment erosion, and export collapse, confirming the retaliatory trade channel as the dominant transmission mechanism. China's manufacturing dependence amplified losses compared to India's relative resilience through services diversification and ASEAN trade rerouting, highlighting asymmetric third-country vulnerabilities.

Calibrated, sector-specific tariffs outperform blanket protectionism. Employment-vulnerable industries warrant targeted measures, while intermediate inputs should remain exempt to minimize supply chain disruptions. H1 (no net US gains) stands partially rejected due to confirmed job creation; H2 (foreign losses) receives full empirical support. Future directions include vector autoregression to address autocorrelation concerns and firm-level analysis to unpack SME versus multinational responses. As President Trump's 2026 tariff agenda unfolds, these findings underscore protectionism's tactical viability as crisis response rather than universal growth strategy, equipping policymakers to navigate complex US-China-India trade dynamics with data-driven precision rather than ideological absolutes.

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