ENTANGLED DETERRENCE: DUAL-USE TECHNOLOGIES AND STRATEGIC STABILITY IN SOUTHERN ASIA

Authors

  • Shubham Rai PhD Scholar, Nelson Mandela Centre for Peace and Conflict, Resolution, Jamia Millia Islamia, Delhi, India Author

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.29121/ShodhSamajik.v3.i1.2026.102

Keywords:

Dual-Use Technologies, Deterrence Stability, Decision Compression, C3i Entanglement, India, Southern Asia, Arms Race, Artificial Intelligence, Counterforce, Credible Minimum Deterrence

Abstract

This paper develops a hybridised theoretical framework, termed "Entangled Deterrence," to examine how dual-use emerging technologies are systematically undermining strategic stability across the Southern Asian security complex. Focusing on India's evolving posture within a tripolar nuclear environment involving China and Pakistan, the paper argues that artificial intelligence-enabled command and control, offensive cyber capabilities, and dual-use space-based sensing infrastructures interact to produce two structurally destabilising effects: decision compression, wherein the time available for deliberate crisis management shrinks to algorithmically determined windows; and C3I entanglement, wherein conventional and nuclear command architectures become indistinguishable to an adversary.

 

References

Acton, J. M. (2018). Entanglement: Chinese and Russian Perspectives on Non-Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Risks. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Aurangzeb, M. (2023). Emerging Technologies and the Security Dilemma in South Asia. Journal of Development and Social Sciences, 4(3), 112–129.

Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. (2019). Satellite Imagery of the Balakot Strike Site. Harvard Kennedy School. Retrieved February 12, 2023, from

Boyd, J. R. (1986). Patterns of Conflict [Unpublished Briefing Document]. United States Air Force.

Brodie, B. (1959). Strategy in the Missile Age. Princeton University Press. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400875108 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400875108

Buzan, B., and Herring, E. (1998). The Arms Dynamic in World Politics. Lynne Rienner Publishers. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781685854003 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/9781685854003

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. (2023). Introduction: Emerging Technologies and the Future of Strategic Stability [Working Paper].

Dawn. (2019, February 27). PM Imran Khan's Address to the Nation. Dawn. Retrieved April 17, 2024, from

Fortunato, M. A. (2023). Artificial Intelligence, Missile Systems, and Missile Defense: Decision Compression, Vulnerability, and Escalation Dynamics in South Asia. Security Science Journal, 4(1), 45–74.

George, A. L., and Bennett, A. (2005). Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences. MIT Press.

Glaser, C. L., and Kaufmann, C. (1998). What is the Offense-Defense Balance, and Can we Measure it? International Security, 22(4), 44–82. https://doi.org/10.2307/2539240 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.22.4.44

Government of India. (2003, January 4). Cabinet Committee on Security reviews operationalisation of India's Nuclear Doctrine. Press Information Bureau. Retrieved August 9, 2023, from

Inter-Services Public Relations. (2019, February 27). ISPR Statement on Aerial Engagement. Pakistan Armed Forces. Retrieved September 14, 2024, from

Jervis, R. (1978). Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma. World Politics, 30(2), 167–214. https://doi.org/10.2307/2009958 DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/2009958

Khalid, A. (2023). U.S.-China Militarisation and the Risks to Global Strategic Stability. Strategic Studies Quarterly, 17(2), 88–113.

Klare, M. T. (2023, February). Assessing the Dangers: Emerging Military Technologies and Nuclear (in)Stability. Arms Control Today. Retrieved January 29, 2024, from

Krepinevich, A. F. (1994). Cavalry to Computer: The Pattern of Military Revolutions. The National Interest, (37), 30–42.

Kristensen, H. M., and Norris, R. S. (2018). Pakistani Nuclear Forces, 2018. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 74(5), 348–358. https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2018.1507796 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2018.1507796

Lieber, K. A., and Press, D. G. (2006). The Rise of U.S. Nuclear Primacy. Foreign Affairs, 85(2), 42–54. https://doi.org/10.2307/20031910 DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/20031910

Lindsay, J. R. (2013). Stuxnet and the Limits of Cyber Warfare. Security Studies, 22(3), 365–404. https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2013.816122 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2013.816122

Ministry of Defence, India. (2019). Annual Report 2019–20. Government of India. Retrieved December 3, 2023, from

Ministry of Defence, India. (2023). Annual Report 2023–24. Government of India. Retrieved March 18, 2024, from

Ministry of External Affairs, India. (2019, February 26). Official Spokesperson's Statement on Preemptive Strike. Government of India. Retrieved August 2, 2024, from

Murray, W. (1997). Thinking About Revolutions in Military Affairs. Joint Force Quarterly, (16), 69–76. https://doi.org/10.21236/ADA354177 DOI: https://doi.org/10.21236/ADA354177

Narang, V. (2014). Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict. Princeton University Press. https://doi.org/10.23943/princeton/9780691159829.001.0001 DOI: https://doi.org/10.23943/princeton/9780691159829.001.0001

Pandit, R. (2019, February 27). India Carries out Ballistic Missile Test Amid Standoff. The Times of India. Retrieved May 21, 2024, from

Pant, H. V. (2011). The U.S.-India Nuclear Pact: Policy, Process, and Great Power Politics. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198073963.001.0001 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198073963.001.0001

Pant, H. V., and Sood, V. (2021). An India that Can Say Yes: A Responsible Rising Power. Observer Research Foundation.

Rajagopalan, R. P. (2023). India's Space Cybersecurity Mesh: Criticality and Call of Purple Revolution. Observer Research Foundation. Retrieved July 7, 2024, from

Richelson, J. (1990). Defying the Arms Race: Verification and Verification Challenges. Arms Control, 11(2), 159–183.

Scharre, P. (2018). Army of None: Autonomous Weapons and the Future of War. W. W. Norton and Company.

Schelling, T. C. (1966). Arms and Influence. Yale University Press. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt5vm52s DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt5vm52s

Sood, V. (2020). India's Wars: A Military History, 1947–1971 [With Supplementary Crisis Communication Analysis]. HarperCollins India.

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. (2023). SIPRI yearbook 2023: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security. Retrieved February 28, 2024, from https://doi.org/10.1093/sipri/9780198890720.002.0008 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/sipri/9780198890720.002.0008

The Hindu. (2019, August 16). India's no-First-Use Policy May Change, Says Rajnath Singh. The Hindu. Retrieved September 4, 2023, from

Waltz, K. N. (1979). Theory of International Politics. Addison-Wesley.

Downloads

Published

2026-05-26

Issue

Vol. 3 No. 1 (2026): Volume 3 Issue 1 January-June 2026

Section

Articles

License

Copyright (c) 2026 Shubham Rai (Author)

Creative Commons License

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

With the licence CC-BY, authors retain the copyright, allowing anyone to download, reuse, re-print, modify, distribute, and/or copy their contribution. The work must be properly attributed to its author.

It is not necessary to ask for further permission from the author or journal board. 

This journal provides immediate open access to its content on the principle that making research freely available to the public supports a greater global exchange of knowledge.